Ukraine’s fall will only encourage Putin to continue down this path. And the consequences will be unpredictable. (article published 16 June 2022 – Observador)
1. The NATO-Russia Council was just over two years old when Boris Yeltsin nominated Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister. After that, gradually, what used to be a forum for consultation, consensus, cooperation, decision-making and joint action for security issues within the Euro-Atlantic region began to fade away. The reasons for detachment were not only due to old Russian suspicions about NATO enlargements. The installation of the NATO missile defense system in Europe also raised significant questions.
In 2007, Putin began to ask for a revision of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) seeking security enhancement. General Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, acknowledged that Russia was considering unilaterally withdrawing from the INF Treaty, in response to the deployment of the NATO missile defense system in Europe and because other countries, like China, were not bound by the Treaty. In the same year, Russia suspended and later withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Shortly thereafter, the Kremlin announced an 8-year investment of US$100 billion in modernizing its military capabilities and developing completely new nuclear missile systems. Today we know that Putin’s motivations were different. Russian actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2008), as well as Crimea (2014) and the present ignoble interference in Ukraine illustrate this statement.
2. There is, since 1725, in Russia, a document that, apocryphal or not, seems to have influenced its behavior as a State. Not even the 1917 Revolution and the consequent regime change altered the execution of the ideas contained therein: territory and influence. Just remember how the Bolsheviks reacted to the territorial loss imposed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. I refer the Testament of Peter the Great.
In 2007, I authored an article – Crossroads – where I discussed Russia’s shift to a capitalist system and the resulting growth potential, saying that I would not be surprised if the germ of expansion reappeared. I said that the “heirs” of Peter the Great appeared to be revitalized. At least, as far as his current successor [Putin] was concerned in Russia’s resurgence on the world stage.
However, I missed one point in my analysis. I considered that Putin used the control system characteristic of the political apparatus of the former Soviet Union, but that he abandoned the communist system, merging these factors into the equation of democracy, when what Vladimir Putin was creating was an autocratic corporatist political structure, like the Chinese, under democracy’s guise.
Georgia, Crimea, and the invasion of Ukraine serve to prove Putin’s pattern of behavior. But something earlier happened that cannot be forgotten – Chechnya.
I have already written about Putin’s strange rise to power. As prime minister, and even as interim president, polls showed Putin had low levels of approval. Everything changed with the war in Chechnya. Do you remember what triggered this war? It was the explosion of bombs in apartment blocks in Moscow, attributed to Chechen terrorists. The Russian retaliation, which flattened Grozny (identical to what is happening in several Ukrainian cities) made Putin a popular hero.
Vladimir Putin has just compared himself to Peter the Great. Putin also hinted that without the 21-year war it would not have been possible for the Russian Tsar to found Russia’s new capital, St. Petersburg. built on land that no European country recognized as Russian. After hearing this, I wonder where Putin intends to establish the new Russian capital?
3. Why should we continue to support Ukraine? Because the fall of Ukraine will only serve to keep Putin on this path. He did not stop at Crimea; he will not stop at Donbass. European leaders must avoid pressure on Zelensky that imply territorial concession. As well as providing an incentive for Putin, it could also mean the end of Ukrainian unity around its President. What happens next? What effects will have the fall of Ukraine on the countries of the European Union and on NATO? Who can tell us that the war will not reach the borders of Poland and Germany? Especially if we show weakness. Make no mistake. It is in Ukraine that democracy, freedom, and respect for international law are being fought for.
How can we show more firmness? I know how the dynamics between the European institutions work, namely between the Commission and the European Council. I believe that Ursula Von der Leyen and that Charles Michel tend towards the integration of Ukraine in the EU. I support this measure, but I am concerned about the time such recognition involves.
Exceptional times require extraordinary responses. Therefore, I suggest an Ad Hoc procedure to speed up the process. I am aware of all the implications inherent in this suggestion. I am also aware that all candidate countries for accession must comply with the Acquis Communautaire and that there are other countries with previous requests. However, none of these countries have been invaded, nor are they at war. Furthermore, in the same Ad Hoc procedure, the subsequent conditions for Ukraine to become a fully-fledged Member State would also be expressed.
We must learn from the lessons of life and of history. Both the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have shown us that some decisions need to be reconsidered. We cannot remain dependent on just one country (either as a supplier or as a partner) and that, for example, we urgently need to formulate policies to encourage nearshore and onshore production in a myriad of areas. But what is at stake now is saving lives. It is not about deciding policies. We must reaffirm the Values we uphold. That is why we are deeply touched by the Ukrainians attitude. They are showing us that Democracy and Freedom comes at a cost.
It is undeniable that under Ursula Von der Leyen leadership, European sanctions have reached an unprecedented level. But it is necessary to go further. Vladimir Putin is not to be trusted. Hence, it is necessary to give an unequivocal sign of firmness.
To describe both Europe’s current circumstances and the measure of our resolve, Churchill’s sentence is the most fitting. Against those who uphold totalitarian ideas there is only one position: an unequivocally reaffirmation of democratic principles! One cannot just say. One must also act accordingly. And yes. Democracy and Freedom have costs!
Furthermore, by evoking Churchill and the context in which such words where expressed, we are remembered to what today is at stake. At the time, the choice was between defend or compromise our values and principles. At the time, despite all the warnings, Nazi threats were ignored.
Chamberlain was not willing to let go his appeasement policy. He was so keen to the idea that even after the Anschluss, Chamberlain went to the point of sanction Hitler’s desire on the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia (1938). Only after intense diplomatic pressure of the British (and the French) Government, did the Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš agreed with the demands for Sudeten autonomy. Later that year, the Munich Conference, classified by Chamberlain as the moment of “peace for our time”, handed over the Sudetenland districts to Germany. This signified the first sign of real concession, and we already know what happened next.
Hitler tactics were simple. Through local supporters, preferably with ethnic ties and endowed with political organization, subversive acts would be carried out to provide a pretext for German military action. Who was Hitler’s trusted man in the Sudetenland region? Konrad Henlein.
History is our greatest Teacher. We must learn its lessons. As such, it is primordial to bear in mind that even after all these events, among the British corridors of power there were those who argued for a peace treaty with Hitler. Imagine how history would have been if such moment had happened?
To have a better understanding of the subject under consideration, we also cannot disregard the consequences of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and its Secret Protocol, which defined the borders of Soviet and German spheres of influence across Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.
Neither Stalin nor the Bolsheviks ever got over the territory loss caused by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918). The signing of the Treaty was all but peaceful. During the discussion within the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, when Lenin told the delegates that saving the world revolution required validate such shameful peace and if they did not sign, he would resign, he was called a traitor. So, Stalin saw in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact the opportunity to recover Lenin’s lost empire. As we know, in Yalta he went further, and soviet influence reached another level.
The aftermath of the Second World War represented the beginning of a new international framework. Faced with the failure of the League of Nations, the leaders of the Allied countries began a new process of international negotiation that culminated in the creation of a new intergovernmental organization, the United Nations (UN) and with it a new regulation for international law. Key examples are the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The UN Charter codifies the major principles of international relations, varying from sovereign equality of States to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. One of the objectives expressed in its preamble is “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained” and all UN members are bond to it. Putin’s Russia is no exception.
Danielle Young says that “since its inception, whatever post-war international order that exists has been under siege.” Yes, as we live in a world of nations, we can accept that view. Within the realm of international relations, realism and the importance of power and the balance of power as guarantees of security reigns supreme. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the current international environment is different from the one that prevailed before the Second World War.
Hans Morgenthau in its 1948 book – Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace – enumerated the six principles of realism. Although he had stressed the significance of foreign policy ethic dimension, policy makers paid little attention to it. Today, unfortunately, two of Morgenthau’s tenets – that realism is a perspective aware of the moral significance of political action; and the moral aspirations of a single community or a state may not be universally valid or shared – are almost forgotten.
Throughout history how many times was language, and ethnic population, and “protection” evoked as an argument to disrespect international law? Putin and his supporters have been mimicking Hitler’s tactics.
Relations between Russia and Georgia began to worsen after the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, which caused the downfall of Eduard Shevardnadze and signal a pro-Western foreign policy aiming a European and Euro-Atlantic integration. By April 2008, relations between both countries reached a full diplomatic crisis, and in August Russia invaded Georgia. How did Medvedev justify this decision? Russia wanted to shield and help the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Concerning the latter Putin also argued that the military intervention was to protect Osseitians from Georgian “genocide.” Who were the Kremlin friends in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoyty.
In 2014, after the Kremlin loss of political influence due to Maidan Revolution and the consequent ousting of Viktor Yanukovych and his government, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Once again, Putin employed Nazi tactics. Pro-Russian demonstrations were held in Sevastopol, masked Russian troops without insignia took over the Supreme Council of Crimea and Sergey Aksyonov, a declared Kremlin supporter, with the presence of the gunmen armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket launchers, was “elected” Prime Minister of Crimea.
What triggered Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and annex Crimea? His concerns about the people of Crimea ability to freely express their will. That is why Russian troops occupied Crimea. To ensure freedom of speech and of choice. Curiously, while Yanukovych was in power and Russia maintained influence over the political decisions made in Kyiv, Putin saw no problem with the Crimeans freedom of expression.
Finally, what was the reason given by Putin to justify the invasion of Ukraine? “Denazification.” Intriguingly, the Kremlin gave no justification about the war crimes committed by the Russian troops, the attacks to civilians, and, among other things, the looting and theft of Ukrainian cereals.
Once again, the choice is between defend or compromise our values and principles. Once again, all warnings were ignored. All those, including Henry Kissinger, who say that we must find a way to save Putin’s face are wrong.
We keep neglecting Karaganov’s Doctrine. We keep disregarding Dugin’s concepts. We keep forgetting that Empire is the most enduring idea within all Russians elites, regardless of the epoch. We keep ignoring that Putin’s regime is nothing but a corporativist system. Let me ask you this. Concerning Crimea’s annexation what is more plausible? An act of Russian nationalism or an act of Russian imperialism?
Putin evaluated us in Georgia. Almost nothing was done. Putin annexed Crimea. Again, almost nothing was done. Putin invaded Ukraine. Finally, we are really reacting. But if our position weakens, Putin will do whatever and wherever he wants. Concerning Europe, this is what Putin and his staff desire: Russians want to be in, throw the Americans out and keep the Germans down. Which they will only accomplish with NATO disbanding.
The last thing we should do is save Putin’s face. Neither Putin nor his entourage can be trusted. Obviously, I am not advocating an invasion of Russia to overthrow Putin. That task falls entirely to the Russian people. What is essential to do is to unmask Putin’s lies, to show that he is an autocratic despot and to encourage those who have the courage to stand up to him through democratic procedures.
The latest form of Russian blackmail is the threat of nuclear war. Either they give me what I want, or else. We simply cannot give in. Nothing guarantees us that Putin will stop. In fact, his behavior indicates that what will surely happen are more abuses and demands. If Putin starts a nuclear war, it will not just be our children who will die. Losses will be global.
Circumstances may reveal people’s abilities, but it is choices that bring out character. Both Putin and Zelensky are revealing who they are. So must we. As such, we must be worthy of those who gave their last measure of devotion for us. We must show the same unwavering resolution and do what is right.
That is the only way we will properly honor those who allowed us to be what we are – Churchill, de Gaulle, Roosevelt, Pierlot, Dupong, Adenauer, Monnet, Schuman, Spaak, among many others.
Brevemente, num Observador perto de si!
Ask a nation to manifest through a referêndum
is an example of dignity.
And fulfill the treaties signed? Or honor commitments?
It is also not worthy?
To the best of my knowledge, no one is telling Mr.Tsipras and Mr. Varoufakis they can not fulfil the promises made to the greek people, expressed in Syriza’s political manifesto. They were legitimately elected and must be the first ones to know if it is possible to reconcile such promises with the Greek external obligations.
The greek government is within its rights to stop payments to creditors, an option consistent with the electoral promises.
And if they are not willing to come to terms with the Eurogroup, because of promises made, then they should be consistent with this position and accept the inherent responsibility: Leave the Euro and become the master of their own destiny.
Greece’s problem is much more endogenous than exogenous. Quite naturally, they want and cherish the welfare state. However, Greece is unable to support and sustain its own welfare state due to poor collection of taxes. This is a chronic problem, which the current greek government has not yet addressed.
Ironically, Tsipras and Varoufakis seem to be loyal followers of a german philosopher. Kant believed that one must do what is right regardless of the consequences.
But, in this case, the consequences will be experienced by the greeks.
Be that as it may, Portugal has a lot to gain with this standoff.
Ninguém diz a Tsipras e Varoufakis que não podem cumprir as promessas feitas ao povo grego, expressas no manifesto político do Syriza.
Eles foram legitimamente eleitos e devem ser os primeiros a saber se é possível conciliar tais promessas com as obrigações externas gregas.
O governo grego está no seu direito de parar de pagamentos aos credores, uma opção consistente com as promessas eleitorais.
E se não estão dispostos a entrar em acordo com o Eurogrupo, por causa de promessas feitas, então eles devem ser coerentes com esta posição e aceitar a responsabilidade inerente: Deixar o Euro e tornarem-se mestres do seu próprio destino.
O problema da Grécia é muito mais endógeno do que exógeno. Muito naturalmente, os gregos querem e valorizam o estado social. No entanto, a Grécia é incapaz de apoiar e sustentar seu próprio estado social devido à má cobrança de impostos. Este é um problema crônico, que governo grego atual ainda não abordou.
Ironicamente, Tsipras e Varoufakis parecem ser fiéis seguidores de um filósofo alemão. Kant acreditava que um deve fazer o que é certo, independentemente das consequências.
Mas, neste caso, as conseqüências serão sentidas pelos gregos.
Seja como for, Portugal tem muito a ganhar com este impasse.
The events leading to Crimea’s secession from Ukraine are not a series of ad-hoc moves, but part of a calculated plan by Russia’s leaders that fits Alexander Dugin’s vision of ‘Eurasianism’.
Accordingly, Russia is determined to follow its own Eurasian path, while the real goal of Eurasianism is the formation of a new political integration bloc. The European Union (EU) and NATO response must set limits on Russia.
A Retrospective View
Following the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not disappear as did the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, NATO grew in size and depth, welcoming former Soviet republics, such as the Baltic states, as members. As a result, in 1999 NATO changed its strategic concept, and the scope of NATO interventions expanded to remote 65ºE and 70ºE meridians of Afghanistan. In 2002, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council reinforced the relationship between NATO and Russia. Later, at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO’s new Strategic Concept was published in response to the changing international security environment. This “Active Engagement, Modern Defense” concept reaffirmed the importance of strategic cooperation with Russia, and it strengthened the political consultations and practical NATO-Russia cooperation. The world has undergone radical change since the Cold War. In the 1980s, who would have thought that NATO and Russia would be partners?
However, almost all of this happened in a period of Russian economic weakness and political disorientation. After President Boris Yeltsin’s 1999 resignation, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent, took over control of Russia. Putin’s presidency coincided with an outstanding economic recovery (1) and soon Russia re-emerged as an economic and energy superpower. Yet nostalgia proved irresistible in 2014, when Vladimir Putin demonstrated that he had been living in the Cold War era. Russia’s new economic capacity permitted an increase in military spending. The political posture of the Russian leadership changed as well, as evidenced by Putin’s Munich speech in February 2007 and the 2008 Georgia war. Thus, Russia’s agenda clashed anew with NATO enlargement, which from 1999 to 2004 grew to include Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Thus, Russian concerns over NATO resurfaced (2). Finally, the 2010 Russian Federation Military Doctrine expressed disapproval of NATO Eastern expansion and listed NATO as an external threat (3).
A Russian Spring?
Russia’s subsequent actions indicate that Moscow has devised a new strategy aimed at the restoration of Russia’s past glory. Some preparatory steps along this route, including Russia’s exit from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, should have been viewed as a tactical move rather than diplomatic protest (4). Such steps are consistent with a realization of a general assertive Russian strategy that paved the way to war with Georgia in 2008. In fact, Russian hawks were convinced after the intervention in Georgia
that they had found a way to prevent further NATO enlargement (5). President Dmitry Medvedev’s statements in November 2011 echo that conviction (6). The naval base in Gudauta, Abkhazia, and Russia’s “Sevastopol agreements” with Ukraine, which extended the Black Sea Fleet lease until 2042, advanced Russia’s military doctrine and also contained NATO.
NATO cannot grant membership to a country hosting a non-member military base on its territory. So far, Russia’s strategy has worked: neither Ukraine nor Georgia has joined NATO since Russia invaded them.
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and inclusion into the Russian Federation may be seen as a continuation of the same strategy. Earlier this year, when Putin realized that Viktor Yanukovych was going to be impeached by the Ukrainian Parliament and that Ukraine would not join the Eurasian Customs Union, Putin responded according to the script he used with Georgia in 2008, the only difference being that Crimea requested formal inclusion in the Russian Federation. On March 18 the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation was signed (7).
Seen from this perspective, Viktor Yanukovych’s call for a referendum towards a ‘federalization’ of Ukraine is just an act in Vladimir Putin’s screenplay. The fact that the city of Donetsk (8) and Eastern Ukraine (9) are already being targeted confirms that Russia likely is not going to stop. Furthermore, Odessa may follow the same path (10). Observing these events, one must assume that the most likely scenario is the creation of a new Eastern bloc of satellite states headed by Moscow. Having in mind both the psychological profile of the current Russian leaders, particularly Vladimir Putin, and the sequence in the evolution of Russia with the West, tiny regions like Transnístria (11) or Gagaúzia (12) are going to be disputed, as well.
Friends or Foes?
Russia does not have a high opinion of the European Union on defense and security issues, not only due to the EU’s lack of competence in this area but also because the EU is no match to Russia in military terms. Moreover, aware of its energy predominance over Europe, Russia favors bilateral negotiations with the EU member states. In addition, Russia not only challenged but also rejected EU’s most fundamental feature, its normative power or “Model Power Europe” (13). In fact, Russia was able to promote Europeanization from the East by reversing the political conditionality and asymmetry within the EU-Russia relation (14). Concerning Ukraine, EU actions were disappointing, to say the least. However, this is not surprising: EU action parallels what happened during and after the 2008 Georgia war. Back then, the Extraordinary European Council suspended negotiations with Russia until Russian troops’ withdrawal from Georgia. Talks resumed, notwithstanding the fact that the Russian troops had not withdrawn. Given the fact that the EU did not ponder political alternatives to these actions, the inevitable question arises about what the EU cherishes most, its energy or its values (15).
For its part, NATO decided to suspend cooperation with Russia, but Russia’s leadership does not seem too offended. Alexander Lukashevich, Russia’s foreign ministry spokesman, recalled that this is not the first time such a gesture was assumed by the West and that after Russia’s war with Georgia NATO-Russia militar cooperation resumed (16). But while Russia is not worried about the interruption of a dialogue with NATO, Moscow does fear the integration of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Thus far, Western sanctions do not seem to have had an effect on the Kremlin strategy (17). Quite the contrary (18). Hence, if “freezing assets” is not an issue for Russians, what is? The Kremlin propaganda at the same time does its best to discredit any proactive policy by the West towards Crimea. According to the notorious Director General of the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, Dmitry Kiselev, even the present response of the West, restrained though it is, deserves the following label: “Western behavior borders on schizophrenia” (19).
Boldness: Unexpected and Necessary
None of the three countries that are victims of Russia’s actual or potential separatist policy – Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – can join NATO or the EU with a ‘pending’ territorial conflict with a neighbor. Therefore, the cost of their accession may well be giving up a part of their country. If these states are willing to pay such high price, NATO must welcome them as members as soon as possible. Speeding up Ukrainian, Georgian and Moldovan accession to NATO would be the bold move. Membership Action Plan would not be sufficient (20). Moscow, which has always claimed that NATO enlargement was a broken promise, may be surprised by a swift, unified response, as those in the Kremlin have come to expect feeble behavior and sluggish responses from the EU and even from NATO. A bold move by NATO would finally set limits on Russia’s assertiveness. New Russian interventions in Georgia and Moldova are possible (21). Alexander Grushko, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, reaffirmed Russia’s warning about Ukraine and Georgia membership. But will Russia really intervene if these countries became NATO members? After all, if we are before a novum frigus bellum we know it will not be the same as the previous Cold War. The division lines are already different, perhaps to a higher degree than is commonly thought. Any move that checks Russia’s influence is welcome (22).
Already some positive signs that could be the necessary precondition for such actions are appearing. NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has stated that “Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is in blatant breach of its international commitments and it is a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (23). In Athens on April 5, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated that the EU “should be very firm on international law and the rules that must apply”. Referring to the banner “Crimea is in my heart” placed behind Vladimir Putin during a rally last month, Bildt went further noting that we should wonder what else Putin cares about (24). Indeed, one must ask what is going to be the cost of the resurgence of Russian greatness, and how far Russia’s leadership might go. However, we know one thing already: any sign of hesitation from the West will be interpreted by Moscow as a license to proceed with Russia’s previous course. Presently, Russia is well ahead in the triggering of events. Should the EU and especially NATO conform? Now is the time for decision. Deciding according to convenience means a loss of credibility. It also shows a marked lack of values. EU countries must show cohesion and speak with a single voice. NATO must act according to its essential purpose. A refocusing and ‘returning’ to Europe on the part of NATO, rather than a stubborn maintenance of the “Asian pivot”, is wise. And taking a stand against Russia confirms NATO’s raison d’être.
1 International Monetary Fund, “Russia – Gross Domestic Product, constant prices” (IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013).
2 Vladimir Putin, “Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council” (President of Russia, 4 April 2008).
3 Dmitry Medvedev, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (President of Russia, 5 February 2010).
4 Yuri Zarakhovich, “Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty” (Time, 14 July 2007).
5 Denis Dyomkin, “Russia says Georgia war stopped NATO expansion” (Reuters, 21 November 2008).
6 Dmitry Astahov, “Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia prevented NATO growth – Medvedev” (Ria Novosti, 21 November 2011).
7 Bridget Kendall, “Crimea crisis: Russian President Putin’s speech annotated” (BBC News, 19 March 2014).
8 Maria Finoshina, “Eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk rallies in favor of independence referendum” (RT, 5 April 2014).
9 “Ukraine crisis: What is happening where?” (BBC News, 14 April 2014).
10 Anastasia Vlasova and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukrainian nationalists, pro-Russian separatists stage rival rallies in Odessa” (KyivPost, 6 April 2014).
11 Christian Oliver, “Tiny Transnistria becomes the frontline in east-west struggle” (Financial Times, 4 April 2014).
12 Tiago Ferreira Lopes, “Post-soviet Unfrozen Dilemmas: Profiling Gagauzia” (State Building and Fragility Monitor, No. 7, March 2014).
13 Laura Ferreira-Pereira, “The European Union as a ‘Model Power’: Spreading Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in the Wider World”, in Federiga Bindi (ed.), The European Union Foreign Policy: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World (Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
14 Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The many patterns of Europeanization: European Union Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”, in Teresa Cierco (ed.), The European Union Neighborhood. Challenges and Opportunities (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
15 Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on Ukraine” (European Union, 20/21 March 2014).
16 Timothy Heritage, “Russia says NATO reverts to Cold War-era mindset” (Reuters, 2 April 2014).
17 “Russian Deputy PM Plays Down Western Sanctions” (Ria Novosti, 15 March 2014).
18 Igor Ivanov, “Western Sanctions Are a Sign of Weakness” (The Moscow Times, 27 March 2014).
19 “Western behavior borders on schizophrenia” (Ria Novosti, 5 April 2014).
20 Joshua Kucera, “Ivanishvili: We Will Get NATO MAP in 2014” (Eurasianet.org, 2 May 2013).
21 Nicu Popescu, “After Crimea: Putin’s Balance Sheet” (EUISS, Issue Alert No. 24, 4 April 2014); Giorgi Menabde, “Kremlin’s Followers in Georgia Become Active” (The Jamestown Foundation, 3 April 2014).
22 “Eurasian Economic Union Treaty Could Be Signed by May” (Ria Novosti, 3 April 2014).
23 Fred Dews, “NATO Secretary-General: Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Is Illegal and Illegitimate” (Brookings Now, 19 March 2014).
24 Demetris Nellas, “EU Working With Russia, Ukraine to Defuse Crisis” (Associated Press, 5 April 2014).
Read more here: IPRIS Viewpoint 144
Concerning Europe, this is what Putin and “entourage” desire:
Russians want to be in,
throw the Americans out
and keep the germans down.